Wilson and Schooler presented evidence that introspection can diminish the quality of decisions. With some modifications of their procedure, the authors reexamined the mechanisms underlying this effect. Students reported intentions to take college courses based on course descriptions. Participants who reflected on their decision processes showed decreased amounts of processing, suggesting that introspection limited their ability to systematically process information. In contrast, control participants appeared to use heuristic and systematic processing interdependently. Introspection participants generally discriminated less than did control participants between important versus unimportant information. Moreover, introspection participants indicated that they did not weight the information as they should have, countering the possibility that they adapted their strategies to better meet decision context demands. The mechanisms through which introspection affects decision quality are discussed.
Whereaspeopletypicallybelievethatcarefulthought makes for good decisions, they would also agree that overanalyzing a decision can lead to confusion and poor judgments. Wilson and Schooler's (1991) demonstration that reflecting on one's decision processes can produce inferior decisions calls into question important assumptions about the optimality of different ways of processing information. How may we reconcile these findings with the notion that detailed, thorough information processing should lead to better judgmental outcomes? Wilson and Schooler (1991) argued that thinking too much can diminish decision quality. In their second experiment, "rate-all" participants were instructed to pay close attention to the multiple attributes of their decision alternatives and to think about how each piece of information influenced their decisions. Following Linville's (1982) work showing that evaluating a stimulus on multiple dimensions leads to moderate evaluations, Wilson and Schooler predicted and found that rate-all participants made less optimal decisions than did participants who had been told to think carefully. Thus, close scrutiny of one's decision options, to the extent that it increases attention to multiple attributes, may indeed harm decisions.
In seeming contrast, the heuristic-systematic model (e.g., Chaiken, 1980 Chaiken, , 1987 Chaiken, Giner-Sorolla, & Chen, 1996; Chaiken, Liberman, & Eagly, 1989) maintains that when individuals are motivated to make accurate judgments, they undertake a more systematic examination of available information. Rather than simply connoting more thinking, the mark of (accuracymotivated) systematic processing is its sensitivity to the validity and strength of information. In decision contexts, systematic processing entails detailed scrutiny of option attributes that distinguishes between relevant and irrelevant attributes. Moreover, decision-making experiments have revealed that people believe that systematic processing produces more accurate judgments (Creyer, Bettman, & Payne, 1990; Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1988 ; see also Chaiken et al., 1989; Chen & Chaiken, 1999) .
Objective evidence that detailed processing harms decision quality, then, is indeed worrisome. According to Linville's (1982) moderation logic, systematic processing could have the same effects as rate-all introspection if systematic processing instigates greater attention to multiple attributes. We doubt, however, that this logic fully accounts for the detrimental effects of rate-all introspection. In the Wilson and Schooler (1991) research, both control and rate-all participants evaluated their options on multiple dimensions and thus should have been equally prone to its effects. We hypothesize that the negative effects of rate-all introspection stem from its disruption of systematic processing. This task demands that people allocate attentional resources to reflecting on the contribution each attribute of their various options makes to their decisions. This activity may actually limit people's abilities to process relevant information because their attention becomes overly focused on analyzing the extent of each piece of information's influence and not enough on evaluating the relative merits of the different attributes. In essence, we argue that rate-all introspection functions like other factors that have been shown to limit capacity for systematic processing (e.g., cognitive load, time pressure) (see Chaiken et al., 1996) .
When systematic processing is disrupted, judgments may be mediated primarily by heuristics such as "consensus implies correctness." Although we might therefore expect that Wilson and Schooler's (1991) rate-all participants would have manifested greater evidence of heuristic processing, it was control participants who appeared more reliant on heuristics, insofar as they indicated a greater likelihood of taking classes highly recommended by other students. It thus seems necessary to clarify introspection's effects on heuristic processing as well.
Finally, another possible introspection effect is to modify people's ideas about how they should weight information in their decisions. Bettman, Johnson, Luce, and Payne (1993) showed that considering more attributes may produce better judgment when no one choice option appears superior. Perhaps rate-all instructions increase people's awareness of the indistinguishability of alternative options and the tendency to be less selective in considering their various attributes.
We replicated Wilson and Schooler's (1991) Experiment 2, with important modifications. We manipulated the importance of participants' decisions to vary motivation for systematic processing. To index systematic processing, we added thought-listing and free-recall measures.
We also manipulated the valence of consensus information to better examine how rate-all introspection affects susceptibility to a heuristic cue. Finally, to assess the perceived adaptivity of participants' decision strategies, we asked not only how much they had been influenced by the various attributes of their options but also how much they should be influenced by these various attributes. If rate-all introspection disrupts systematic processing, decrements in such processing should be observed, and participants' thoughts should reflect less critical evaluation of decision-relevant information. If introspection changes participants' ideas about how information should be used, this should be reflected in their ratings of the importance of different attributes as well as their greater use of strategies reflecting these altered perceptions.
METHOD

Procedure
In small groups, 184 introductory psychology students at New York University participated for course credit. They were told that they were to complete a survey of students' course interests that the psychology department conducts to evaluate curriculum changes. The importance of this task was then manipulated (see below). Participants then received descriptions of six psychology courses. Afterward, they indicated their intentions to take each course and then completed a series of measures assessing (a) the degree to which they had been influenced by the different course attributes; (b) their recall of the course information; (c) how much weight they thought should be given to the different course attributes in choosing courses; and (d) their confidence in, certainty about, and likelihood of changing their decisions. Participants were then debriefed and excused.
Course Descriptions
Each course description began with an overall evaluation of the course by previously enrolled students (consensus cue, see below), after which 11 types of information appeared: name of professor, course schedule and room number, required and recommended prerequisites, major requirements satisfied by the course, course requirements, course format, summary of course content, reading list, and three additional pieces of information from previous students (their supposed ratings of intellectual stimulation, the teacher and his or her methods, and amount learned). Participants provided a 12th piece of information indicating their interest in the course topic on a 9-point scale. The values of the attributes mentioned were randomly assigned for each course, and both the courses and their 12 attributes were presented in one of two random orderings. After having read each course description, participants were instructed to write down whatever thoughts that may have come to mind as they were reading about this course.
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Independent Variables
Control participants were told to read the course information carefully. In addition, after reading about each course attribute, rate-all participants were told to stop and think about this piece of information and judge its likely impact on their decisions on a 9-point scale.
High-motivation participants were told that student input is weighed heavily in curriculum planning and so the survey could affect whether a class would be offered in the future. In contrast, low-motivation participants were told that the student survey is taken yearly but that their decisions would have little impact on curriculum decisions.
Three of the six course descriptions that participants read featured positive consensus cues, and three featured negative consensus cues; across participants, each course was associated with either positive or negative consensus. The cue was a pie chart showing the percentages of students who answered yes and no to the question "Would you recommend this course?" accompanied by a list of 10 comments sampled from previous students. Percentages in the pie chart ranged from 70% to 90% yes responses and 10% to 30% no responses for positive consensus, and were reversed for negative consensus. The comments were nonspecific valenced statements, such as "I loved it" and "I'm sorry I took this class." Eight of the 10 comments were positive (vs. negative) when consensus information was positive (vs. negative).
1
Dependent Measures
All measures used 9-point scales unless otherwise noted. Participants' decision intentions were assessed by having them rate the likelihood of taking each course (definitely will not vs. will take this course). Their perceptions of influence were assessed by having them rate how much each course attribute had influenced their decisions (did not influence me at all vs. influenced me a great deal), whereas their normative perceptions (assessed subsequently) were measured by having them rate how much weight each course attribute received should be given in choosing courses (should be given very little weight vs. should be weighted very heavily). On the surprise recall task, participants wrote down whatever they could remember about each course. A (blind) coder subsequently assigned the scores +1, 0, or -1 for each piece of course information correctly recalled, not recalled, or recalled incorrectly.
2 Participants rated their confidence in and certainty about the decisions they made and their likelihood of changing these decisions.
3 These scales' anchors were not at all and very certain/confident/likely. Finally, participants' thoughts about course attributes were classified by the first author according to type of information to which it pertained (e.g., teacher, format, workload) and according to its valence (positive, negative, or neutral) toward taking the course. 4 
RESULTS
Processing Measures
Recall accuracy for the three least and most important attributes 5 was calculated by summing across the three course descriptions within each consensus condition. These scores ranged from -8 to +6 (M = -0.52). An Introspection × Motivation × Importance × Cue ANOVA with repeated measures on the last two variables 6 yielded a main effect for importance, F(1, 180) = 4.08, p < .05, with better recall for important than unimportant information (Ms = -.33 and -.66). An Introspection × Importance interaction was also obtained, F(1, 180) = 11.24, p < .001, but was qualified by the near-significant Introspection × Motivation × Importance × Cue interaction, F(1, 180) = 3.70, p < .06. The cell means in Table 1 reveal that among highly motivated participants, controls demonstrated especially better memory for important information when the consensus cue was negative, t(180) = 3.26, p < .001. In contrast, introspection participants displayed especially poor memory for important information when consensus was negative; in fact, they made significantly more recall errors for important (vs. unimportant) information, t(180) = -2.06, p < .05. The important versus unimportant information contrast was nonsignificant in all other Introspection × Motivation × Cue conditions. Overall, then, it appears that when motivated to make good decisions and particularly when alerted by negative consensus information, control participants paid closer attention to important information. Introspection participants, on the other hand, appeared unable to focus their attention on important information. Their increased errors in the high-motivation negative cue condition suggests they tried harder to recall important information when it seemed especially crucial but failed because they had not sufficiently attended to these attributes.
The same Introspection × Motivation × Importance × Cue ANOVA on total thoughts listed yielded main effects for importance, F(1, 180) = 37.64, p < .001, and introspection, F(1, 180) = 8.18, p < .01. Important (vs. unimportant) information received greater thought, and control (vs. rate-all) participants listed more thoughts. Yet, the Introspection × Importance interaction, F(1, 180) = 14.06, p < .001 (see Table 2 ) reveals that whereas control participants listed more thoughts about important information, introspection participants listed equal numbers of thoughts about the two types of information. In essence, rate-all participants processed information less thoroughly overall and concentrated less on Tordesillas, Chaiken / INTROSPECTION AND DECISION MAKING 627 processing important information. The favorability of participants' thoughts (positive minus negative ones) was also submitted to an Introspection × Motivation × Importance × Cue ANOVA. Main effects were obtained for introspection, F(1, 180) = 9.01, p < .01, and consensus, F(1, 180) = 4.12, p < .05. Thinking was more favorable toward the course for control (vs. introspection) participants (Ms = .06 vs. -.12), and when the consensus cue was positive (vs. negative) (Ms = .06 vs. -.11). The Introspection × Importance interaction, F(1, 180) = 8.55, p < .01, indicates that control participants listed more positive thoughts about important than unimportant information, whereas rate-all participants listed negative thoughts in both cases (see Table 3 , top panel). Finally, two marginal interactions were obtained: Cue × Introspection, F(1, 180) = 3.05, p < .08, and Cue × Importance, F(1, 180) = 3.31, p < .07. As seen in Table 3 (see  Panel 2 ), the first trend shows that the favorability of control participants' thoughts was aligned with cue valence, whereas rate-all participants' thoughts were negative regardless of cue valence. The second trend (see Panel 3
of Table 3) shows that cue valence affected the favorability of thinking mainly on important information.
The picture that emerges from these processing data is one of control participants undertaking a more discriminating approach to processing decision-relevant information than rate-all participants. Controls' thinking was more favorable in response to important (vs. unimportant) information, indicating their greater systematic processing of course attribute information (see Petty & Cacioppo, 1986) . In addition, control participants showed evidence of the concurrent use of heuristic processing because the favorability of their systematic processing was influenced by consensus information. 
Intentions
An Introspection × Motivation × Cue ANOVA with repeated measures on the last variable was performed on participants' intentions to take each class.
8 A cue effect, F(1, 178) = 57.82, p < .0001, showed heightened intentions when consensus was positive (vs. negative). In addition, a marginal Introspection × Motivation interaction, F(1, 178) = 3.33, p < .07, suggested more positive intentions by control (vs. rate-all) participants, especially under high motivation.
Did rate-all participants moderate their course intentions, as Wilson and Schooler (1991) found? An Introspection × Motivation ANOVA on the within-person standard deviations of participants' intentions to enroll showed more variable intentions among control (vs. rate-all) participants (Ms = 2.14 vs. 1.85), F(1, 178) = 6.70, p < .01. Yet, the two-way interaction, F(1, 178) = 5.99, p < .05, revealed that this difference was reliable only when accuracy motivation was high, p < .01 (Ms = 2.41 vs. 1.81) (Ms = 1.91 vs. 1.89 under low motivation, ns). In fact, only the high-motivation control condition differed from the other three conditions. Rather than indicating that rate-all introspection produces moderated judgments, these results indicate that highly motivated controls' intentions were more differentiated than those of all other participants.
Perceptions of Influence
To examine how participants felt they were influenced by course attribute information, their mean influence ratings of the three most important and three least important course attributes were compared. This Introspection × Motivation × Importance ANOVA (with repeated mea-sures on the last variable) 9 revealed an importance main effect, F(1, 180) = 35.56, p < .0001, as well as a qualifying Introspection × Importance interaction, F(1, 180) = 11.30, p < .001, and three-way interaction, F(1, 180) = 4.35, p < .05. As Table 4 (see upper panel) shows, the overall trend for important attributes to be weighted more heavily than unimportant ones was 628 PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BULLETIN Did introspection change participants' beliefs about the optimal use of information in their decisions? An Introspection × Motivation × Importance ANOVA on participants' ratings of how much each piece of information should be weighted in their decisions yielded main effects for importance and introspection, Fs(1, 180) = 231.22, p < .001, and 8.24, p < .01. Overall, participants thought important (vs. unimportant) information should be given more weight, and control participants gave higher weight ratings than did rate-all participants. Most important, the Introspection × Importance interaction, F(1, 180) = 4.07, p < .05, revealed that rate-all participants believed that unimportant information should be weighted even less than controls (see Table 4 , lower panel). These results do not support the idea that introspection participants thought that they should place greater weight on unimportant information. If anything, they believed more strongly that unimportant information should not carry much weight.
Certainty, Confidence, and Likelihood of Change
Participants' decision certainty and confidence and their likelihood of changing these decisions were also examined. The Introspection × Motivation ANOVAs on these measures showed that control (vs. rate-all) participants were more confident and marginally more certain in their decisions, Fs(1, 154) = 4.23, p < .05, and 3.68, p < .06.
DISCUSSION
This study explored the processes by which Wilson and Schooler's (1991) rate-all introspection instructions influence decision making. Our data show that such introspection disrupts systematic processing by directing attention in such a way that people are less able to focus on information most relevant to a decision task. Introspection participants exhibited decreased systematic processing in their thought listings, generating fewer attribute-related thoughts than controls. Their thinking was also less discriminating than controls, who listed more thoughts about important than unimportant information. This result was mirrored in recall, in which control (vs. rate-all) participants showed a greater tendency to better recall important (vs. unimportant) information. Rate-all participants, who were instructed to consider how each piece of information affected their decisions, divided their attention relatively evenly between important and unimportant course attributes.
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The recall data further indicated that the greater attention paid to important attri-butes by control participants was especially strong when consensus information was negative and they believed their task to be very important. Higher motivation and exposure to the presumably more salient negative consensus cues (see Fiske, 1980) thus engendered more systematic processing for these individuals, insofar as they undertook a more focused, discriminating approach to the information and concentrated on the most relevant aspects of their course options.
Consensus had a main effect on all participants' intentions to take the classes. Because consensus cues were prominent and specific course information somewhat ambiguous, consensus might well have been the clearest indicator of course quality to participants. Introspection participants based their course intentions primarily on cue valence, suggesting a reliance on heuristic processing alone. For control participants, however, conTordesillas, Chaiken / INTROSPECTION AND DECISION MAKING 629 sensus also influenced their processing of the information. In addition to moderating the Introspection × Importance inter-action on recall, the cue affected the favorability of control (but not introspection) participants' thoughts. These findings suggest not only that control participants undertook more systematic processing but also that heuristic processing influenced the nature of their systematic processing. Chaiken and Maheswaran (1994) argued that heuristic processing can bias systematic processing because heuristics can establish expectancies about the nature of particularistic information. They demonstrated this effect when particularistic information was ambiguous, as was true in this study. Control participants appear to have engaged in biased systematic processing, insofar as the consensus cue affected the valence of their attributerelated thinking. As already noted, expectancies raised by the heuristic cue seem also to have affected their scrutiny of information. Negative consensus may have led these participants to be particularly vigilant in reviewing particular classes, resulting in closer attention to important information.
Analyses of differences in the variability of participants' intentions did not show a moderation of evaluations by introspection participants but rather a greater differentiation of evaluations by highly motivated control participants. We attribute the increased variability of their intentions to the greater scrutiny they were able and motivated to devote to their course options. This greater systematic processing, we believe, enabled them to draw finer distinctions between alternatives and to express more differentiated evaluations and clearer preferences.
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Finally, how did participants perceive that their decisions had been affected by introspection? Rate-all participants were not confused about the relative importance of information. They reported equal influence by important and unimportant information mainly under high motivation, where greater task importance may have increased their compliance with a perceived demand to give equal attention to all course attributes. They did not believe, however, that they were processing information optimally. When asked how much each piece of information should be weighted, these participants said that unimportant information should be weighted even less than did controls. Together with their influence ratings, this result suggests that rate-all participants felt that unimportant information had exerted a disproportionate influence on their decisions. Their lowered "should" ratings for unimportant information may have been in reaction to the constraints imposed on them by the experimental task. Their lowered levels of confidence in their decisions add support to this interpretation. Knowing they had allocated attention to unimportant attributes, they perhaps felt they had not processed the information as they would have liked and were less willing to trust their resulting decisions.
We have concentrated on Wilson and Schooler's (1991) rate-all operationalization of introspection because of their intriguing suggestion that more thinking-to the extent that it increases attention to multiple attributes-harms decisions. It appears that the negative effects of rate-all introspection do not ensue from considering multiple attributes per se but are confined to contexts in which people's attention is diverted away from information most relevant to their decisions. There are of course other types of introspection. Gaining insight into our decision processes is not necessarily harmful. But it is important to determine what types of introspection are disruptive (or, perhaps, conducive) to cognitive processing. In this particular case, we have shown that it is when thinking interferes with our ability to focus on relevant information that overanalyzing our decisions can be harmful. NOTES 1. It may be asked why this information was considered a heuristic cue, whereas other information from previous students' course evaluations (intellectual stimulation, the teacher and his or her methods, amount learned) were not. First, the pie chart and accompanying comments were presented first in the course description and were visually salient, taking up roughly one third of the first page of the description. The other student information was embedded with other information within the course description and would have required more attentional capacity to absorb and comprehend. Second, information in the cue was of a global quality to which it is plausible that participants were able to apply a general consensus implies correctness heuristic. The other three types of information were more specific, and it is unclear whether people have heuristics stored in memory regarding the judgmental value of each of these attributes.
2. The first author coded 15 recall questionnaires and intercoder agreement on this set was 88%.
3. These measures were added to the procedure after some sessions had already been conducted. Thus, 16 participants did not complete these measures. 4. A research assistant coded 10 thought protocols and intercoder agreement on this set was 99%.
5. The "should" questionnaire was administered to a subset of introductory psychology students (N = 155) during a mass testing at the beginning of the semester. The three most important pieces of information were interest in the course (M = 3.50, SD = .80), the course description (M = 2.46, SD = 1.66), and the teacher (M = 2.43, SD = 2.01). The three least important were the workload (M = 1.65, SD = 1.95), the reading list (M = 1.39, SD = 2.13), and the course format (M = 1.26, SD = 2.00). In Wilson and Schooler's (1991) faculty survey, the three most important pieces of information were who was teaching the class, the course content, and the prerequisites for the class. The three least important were when the class met, whether there was a required term paper, and whether the course had a discussion section.
6. To ascertain the effects of the manipulations on systematic processing, it would have been useful to include the effects of the valences of the course attributes in these analyses. As described earlier, however, the values of the course attributes were randomly assigned and not directly manipulated. Furthermore, it would have been difficult to quantify the values of two of the important attributes (teacher and course description) and all the unimportant attributes (workload, reading list, and format). Further work to clarify the precise effects on 630 PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BULLETIN systematic processing should focus more on manipulating option attributes directly.
7. An informative analysis to demonstrate differences in systematic processing would examine the effects of the manipulations on within-person correlations between recall, thoughts, and intentions to take each course. Our present design, however, with only six courses per participant, does not provide sufficient statistical power to detect such effects. We could not use too many courses for fear of overtaxing our participants. Future investigations of these effects would ideally include more choice options to allow such analyses.
8. Two participants who did not complete the intentions questionnaire are excluded in this analysis.
9. Because the cue was manipulated within subjects and influence ratings were only obtained once for each participant, the cue variable was not included in this analysis.
10. Although a decrease in recall accuracy is usually indicative of decreased systematic processing, it is not surprising that there was no main effect of introspection on this variable. Having to stop and think about the information still requires participants to attend to the information and may even have functioned as a form of rehearsal. Although this activity may not interfere with storage and retrieval of information, it does seem likely to interfere with cognitive elaboration. Introspection participants were not as free as controls to generate their own reactions to the information and integrate it with existing knowledge. Differences in amount of processing were thus reflected in thought-listing measures.
11. It could be argued that both processes may be occurring and that our data do not unequivocally support one over the other. We favor the decrease in systematic processing interpretation, however, because it is a simpler explanation for the overall pattern of effects. To make a case for the simultaneous operation of both mechanisms, one would need to posit separate mechanisms for the introspection groups (the Linville, 1982 , moderation hypothesis) and the control/low motivation group (less motivation to systematically process information). We find it easier to assume that decreased systematic processing underlies the lack of variation in intentions for all three groups: for the introspection groups because they were unable to engage in systematic processing and for the control/low motivation group because they were unwilling. More direct evidence is required to support the notion that moderation of evaluations due to evaluation of multiple attributes occurs in addition to these processes.
